Is there a correct answer for each legal case? Dworkin versus Finnis
Abstract
The correct legal response for each case proposed by Ronald Dworkin supposes an extraordinary confidence in legal practical reason, and among those who argued with it is the most widespread representative of classical natural law: John Finnis, who, although he affirms the existence of that evaluative reason, is limited to recognizing the dual function of: i) discarding inadmissible responses for suppressing “basic human goods”; and ii) offer equally reasonable and immeasurable alternatives that it is up to the judge to choose between them. These positions and their respective arguments are fully current around the possibilities offered by practical legal reason.
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