Two Conceptions of Human Rights: An Analysis from the Perspective of Practical Reasoning
Abstract
Although there is extensive philosophical discussion regarding the justification and nature of human rights, the specific question of how to understand these normative standards from the perspective of practical reasoning —that is, reflection aimed at action— has received insufficient attention in theoretical literature. The purpose of this article is to address this gap by distinguishing between two distinctive ways of understanding human rights from a practical standpoint, and providing reasons to favour one approach over the other. Specifically, our analysis unfolds in two stages. First, we argue that there are two ways to conceive the practical role of human rights within the contemporary philosophical discussion, based on the type of underlying reasoning: on the one hand, what we call a teleological conception of human rights, which views these normative standards as a guide for the actions of individual and/or collective agents insofar as they represent ends to be pursued; on the other, a non-teleological conception, which prioritizes defining what must be done based on distributed obligations among a plurality of agents, rather than orienting action through the identification of an objective. Second, having identified these two conceptions, this article argues that the non-teleological approach is superior to the teleological approach. The justification we provide rests primarily on two independent reasons: (1) the non-teleological approach more effectively guides action in the context of a plurality of agents, and (2) the non-teleological perspective better protects the concept of human rights from potential inflation resulting from an excessive focus on the ends they pursue, which leads to subsequent normative devaluation.
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