Legislative Oversight of Government in Argentina and Spain: Corollary and Proposals in Light of their Comparative Analysis

Abstract

In academic discourse, particularly within Latin America, there is a prevalent belief that parliamentary systems, which dominate in Western Europe, inherently offer superior mechanisms for legislative oversight of the executive compared to presidential systems, which are frequently criticized for fostering hyper-presidentialism. However, this perspective often neglects the intrinsic characteristic of parliamentary systems that requires the government to derive its democratic legitimacy through Parliament. This necessity effectively amalgamates the executive with the parliamentary majority that sustains it, thereby unifying their will. As a result, the claim that Parliament exercises substantive control over the executive becomes tenuous, as such oversight often devolves into a formal and routine exercise. Therefore, the extent and efficacy of parliamentary oversight over the executive branch, irrespective of whether a country operates under a parliamentary, presidential, or semi-presidential system, are contingent upon the specific mechanisms available to the parliamentary minority to perform this essential role, as well as the political and judicial practices that have evolved within that context. This inquiry is particularly pertinent when assessing the actual capabilities of the political opposition to exert control over the government, both within Parliament and through participation in the appointment and supervision of independent institutions and authorities, across countries with divergent forms of government.