The Judicialization of Politics

Keywords: Judicial Politics, Supreme Court, Argentina, Principal-Agent, Political Question, Juristocracy

Abstract

This article addresses the growing judicialization of politics in Argentina, a phenomenon that has led courts to play an increasingly prominent role in the formulation of public policies, areas traditionally reserved for the legislative and executive branches. The analysis of jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of Argentina illustrates how courts have become crucial actors in political decision-making, particularly in contexts where political actors refrain from making decisions for fear of future electoral repercussion. This development has contributed to the gradual abandonment of the doctrine of non-justiciable political questions, marking a transition towards a juristocracy, in which judges not only interpret the law, but also exert significant influence in shaping the political and social order of the country.

Additionally, the study proposes a new perspective to understand the judicialization of politics, focusing on the principal-agent theory. In this view, courts perform essential oversight and coordination functions within a democracy, acting as control mechanisms to ensure that the government (the agent) acts in accordance with the interests of the people (the principal). This function is fundamental to maintaining popular sovereignty and ensuring that government actions remain within the limits established by law and the constitution, thus underscoring the critical importance of the courts in preserving a healthy democratic balance.

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Author Biography

Jeronimo Lau Alberdi, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad Austral

Abogado (Universidad Austral), LL.M. (Law Center, Georgetown University) y LL.M. en Derecho Constitucional (Universidad Austral). S.J.D. Candidate (School of Law, University of Virginia). Profesor de Derecho Constitucional (Universidad Austral).

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Published
2024-06-28
How to Cite
Lau Alberdi, J. (2024). The Judicialization of Politics. Revista Jurídica Austral, 5(1), 211-254. https://doi.org/10.26422/RJA.2024.0501.alb
Section
Research Articles